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CASES NOTED
THE "EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED" EXCEPTION TO THE
ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT: SECTION 1983
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS QUALIFY
Foster, the prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida, instituted
proceedings to close Mitchum's bookstore as a public nuisance under
Florida's general nuisance statutes.' Ruling that certain magazines of-
fered for sale by Mitchum were obscene under Florida law,2 the trial
judge entered a temporary injunction prohibiting continued operation of
the bookstore. While Mitchum's state appeal of the injunction was pend-
ing, he filed a complaint in federal district court. Relying on United
States Code, title 42, section 1983,1 Mitchum asked for injunctive and
declaratory relief against the state court proceedings, asserting that
Florida law was being unconstitutionally applied by the state court so
as to cause him great and irreparable harm.
Amidst further inconclusive proceedings in the state courts, a single
federal district court judge entered temporary restraining orders, and a
three-judge court was convened.4 The three-judge court denied Mitchum's
prayer for injunctive relief and dissolved the single judge's orders, hold-
ing that the federal court was not empowered, in the face of the Anti-
Injunction Act,' to issue such injunctions.6
On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court,7 held, re-
versed and remanded: United States Code, title 42, section 1983 is an
Act of Congress that falls within the "expressly authorized" exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act. Mitchum v. Foster, 92 S. Ct. 2151 (1972).
As a general practice, federal courts have avoided interference with
threatened or pending state proceedings. This principle of noninterference
is manifested in the doctrines of comity and abstention8 and has been
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 60.05, 823.05 (1971).
2. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1971).
3. Jurisdiction was based on section 1343(3), which provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
* * * To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ...
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
4. The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Injuncion Act].
6. Mitchum v. Foster, 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides for direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court from decisions of three-judge courts.
8. A good discussion of these principles may be found in C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
CoURTs §§ 51, 52 (2d ed. 1970).
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codified in the Anti-Injunction Act. Mitchum, of course, hinged upon
whether United States Code, title 42, section 1983, is a statute that Con-
gress had "expressly authorized" as falling outside the scope of the Anti-
Injunction Act. A brief review of the history of the Act is necessary foi
an understanding of the significance of Mitchum.
The Constitution does not itself prohibit the federal courts from
enjoining state proceedings. However, the Act of March 2, 1793 pro-
hibited the issuance of a writ of injunction "to stay proceedings in any
court of a state."9 With modification only in the area of bankruptcy, °
this language remained intact until the enactment of the Judicial Code of
1948." Although the statute was phrased in clearly prohibitive language
and was calculated "to prevent needless friction between state and fed-
eral courts,"' 2 its effectiveness was lessened by many judicially-created
exceptions."
In 1941 the Supreme Court evidenced a stricter approach to the
application of the Anti-Injunction Act. In the case of Toucey v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 4 the precise issue was whether a federal court
could enjoin a state court suit upon a cause of action previously litigated
in the federal court and resolved against the assignor of the state court
plaintiff."8 Without expressly overruling any prior cases cited as au-
thority for the "relitigation" exception, 8 the Court held that there was
no exception to the statute for "relitigation" cases. Further, it stressed the
statute's basic doctrine of noninterference with pending state court
litigation.'
7
Legislative reaction to Toucey came with the enactment of section
2283 of the Judicial Code of 1948-the Anti-Injunction Act as it now
exists. Section 2283 provides that:
9. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
10. Section 720 of the Revised Statutes, added in 1875, provided an express exception
where bankruptcy laws authorized such injunction. Rev. Stat. § 720 (1875).
11. The provision survived as section 265 of the Judicial Code of 1911, formerly sec-
tion 379 of title 28 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940) (Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162).
12. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940).
13. See Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State
Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1933); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings,
74 HARv. L. REV. 726 (1961).
14. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
15. Prior to Toucey, the Supreme Court had indicated that, despite the Anti-Injunction
Act, the federal courts could enjoin state courts from relitigating questions already deter-
mined by the federal courts. E.g., Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904) ; Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
16. The Court dealt with these and similar cases by dismissing some as in rem actions,
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 n.6 (1941), and saying of the others
that "loose language and a sporadic, ill-considered decision cannot be held to have im-
bedded in our law a doctrine which so patently violates the express prohibition of Con-
gress." Id. at 139.
17. id. at 132.
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A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 8
As indicated in the Reviser's Note, the Anti-Injunction Act not only
overruled Toucey, but "restore[d] the basic law as generally understood
and interpreted prior to the Toucy [sic] decision."'"
Despite its apparently clear language, the Anti-Injunction Act has
presented many difficult questions of construction.20 The "expressly au-
thorized" exception itself is no model of legislative clarity, and judicial
interpretation of the clause prior to Mitchum provided no definite test
for the applicability of this exception. It did, however, furnish federal
courts with some clues.
The exception does not require that the federal law invoked con-
tain an express reference to the Anti-Injunction Act. 21 It is sufficient if
it specifically grants the power to enjoin state court proceedings; 22 how-
ever, such a specific grant of power has not been considered necessary.
23
A statute enabling a federal court to stay any court proceedings also
seemed adequate to constitute the express authorization necessary to
come within the meaning of the Act.24
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
19. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80 Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82 (1947).
20. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 47 (2d ed. 1970).
21. Prior to the Judicial Code of 1948, the recognized statutory exceptions did not
contain any express reference to the Anti-Injunction Act. See Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v.
Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883) (statute imposing limitation on shipowners' liability);
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (statute providing for federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (statute granting removal
jurisdiction); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) (statute providing for
federal interpleader actions) ; Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (statute conferring
federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages) ; Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946) (price
control legislation).
This same position was reaffirmed by the Court subsequent to the enactment of the
Anti-Injunction Act. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348
U.S. 511 (1955).
22. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516
(1955) (dictum).
23. Three of the exceptions recognized prior to the Judicial Code of 1948 contained no
such authorization. See Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883)
(statute imposing limitation on shipowners' liability) ; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.
266 (1922) (statute granting removal jurisdiction) ; Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946)
(price control legislation).
24. The Bankruptcy Act provides that "[a] suit which is founded upon a claim for
which a discharge would be a release ...shall be stayed until an adjudication or the
dismissal of the petition. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). This language apparently authorizes
injunction of state court proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82
(1947).
The Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act provided that, where it applied, a federal
court was to "stay all judicial or official proceedings in any court." 11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(2)
(1958) (since the time for filing a petition under this section expired March 1, 1949, it has
been omitted from the United States Code since 1958). This language was also regarded as
sufficient to authorize federal court injunction of state court proceedings. See H.R. REP. No.
308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181-82 (1947).
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In Mitchum, however, the Court was presented with a different
question-whether an injunction against pending state court actions is
"expressly authorized" when a federal statute grants merely a general
injunctive power. The Civil Rights Act, section 1983, provides for "an
action at law, suit in equity, or otherwise proper proceeding" against
anyone acting under color of state law who has caused another to be de-
prived of his civil rights.25 Whether this language is sufficient to bring
section 1983 within the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act is a question which the Court had previously left open26
and the lower courts had been left to dispute.27
In Mitchum, the section 1983 question was faced squarely:
[I] f a § 1983 action is not an "expressly authorized" statutory
exception, the anti-injunction law absolutely prohibits in such
an action all federal equitable intervention in a pending state
court proceeding, whether civil or criminal, and regardless of
how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be.28
Applying the pre-Toucey criteria,29 the Court stated a positive rule for
the application of the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-In-
junction Act:
[I]t is ,clear that . . . in order to qualify as an "expressly
authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute, an Act of
Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal right
or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, which could
be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin
a state court proceeding.80
This rule, the Court was quick to add, does not require that the act
be "totally incompatible with the prohibitions of the anti-injunction
statute."'" Obligingly, the Court provided a test for inclusion of a fed-
eral statute within the "expressly authorized" exception:
The test . . . is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a
federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity,
could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state
court proceeding. 2
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 1983].
26. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613 n.3 (1968); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972).
27. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950) (section 1983 held an excep-
tion); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939
(1964) and Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (section 1983 held not an
exception).
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2155.
29. The Court referred to the Reviser's Note accompanying the Anti-Injunction Act.
H.R. Ri.p. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181 (1947).
30. 92 S. Ct. at 2159.
31. Id. at 2160.
32. Id. The Court referred to a number of previous decisions after stating the test,
beginning with Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-34 (1941), where the
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In applying the test to section 1983, the Court examined the "intended
scope" of that statute-the legislative history. The Court found that the
congressional concern in enacting section 1983 and its predecessor 3 was
to protect federal rights which it feared were not being protected in state
courts. 4
The Court also found that Congress, in furtherance of this concern,
created in section 1983 a federal remedy.
In carrying out . . . [the purpose of § 1983 to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law]
Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunc-
tions in § 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing "a suit in
equity" as one of the means of redress. 5
In light of this reasoning, the Court concluded that section 1983 meets
the test and is therefore within the "expressly authorized" exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.
Mitchum contributes substance and clarity to the law concerning
the use of federal injunctions to stay pending state proceedings. First, in
holding that section 1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception,
Mitchum implies that a federal injunction against pending state court
actions may be "expressly authorized" when a federal statute grants
merely a general injunctive power.86 Second, Mitchum gives the federal
courts a much needed test for the "expressly authorized" exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act. If the federal act in question clearly creates a fed-
eral right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity and can be
given its intended scope only by the stay of state court proceedings, it is
"expressly authorized."
Third, Mitchum indicates that the determinative criterion to be ap-
plied to the test is the legislative intent surrounding the enactment of the
statute in question. The Mitchum court did not examine current state
court attitudes and practices regarding application of an individual citi-
zen's civil rights, restricting its opinion to the legislative history of sec-
tion 1983 and its predecessor. While such an approach is far from un-
usual, it may well be that it fosters "needless friction" in this contextY
Court discussed pre-1941 judicially-created exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. In none
of the cases referred to had the Mitchum test been laid out.
33. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
34. Congress . . . was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect...
[federally created] rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be anti-
pathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings ex-
tended to the state courts.
92 S. Ct. at 2162.
35. Id.
36. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
37. Although reliance upon legislative intent for an interpretation of a statute is by no
means unusual, it creates a paradox in situations involving the Anti-Injunction Act. For
example, it may be argued that while the Civil Rights Act was, when originally enacted, a
necessary exception, by implication from legislative intent, to the principle of avoiding
"needless friction" between federal and state courts, a more enlightened judicial attitude in
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Fourth, the Court reaffirmed the doctrines of comity, equity, and
federalism. 8 Therefore, as Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring
opinion:
[O]n remand . . . the District Court . . . should properly
consider whether general notions of equity or principles of fed-
eralism . . . prevent the issuance of an injunction against the
state "nuisance abatement" proceedings in the circumstances of
this case.8
Finally, and most obviously, Mitchum holds that section 1983 is an ex-
ception to the Anti-Injunction Act. This ruling may have far-reaching
effects.4o
There remain, however, at least two questions both raised and un-
answered by Mitchum. First, whether the legislative intent criteria is
always to be applied to the Mitchum "expressly authorized" test. The
Mitchum court did in fact apply only this criterion, although the lan-
guage of the test is broad enough to permit current state court practices
to be considered, and even to be determinative.4' Even if legislative in-
tent is the sole prism through which the Mitchum test is to be applied to
federal statutes, it does not necessarily follow that current state court
practices will be ignored. Where the Mitchum test is met, the federal
court must still consider principles of equity, comity and federalism. If
state court abuse of the federally created rights is not an apparent danger
-and here current state judicial practices will certainly be examined-
an injunction may be denied.
A final question, to be resolved by the district court on remand, is
whether the plaintiff, Mitchum, will surmount the principles of comity,
equity, and federalism, and obtain the injunction sought. While Mitchum
still awaits the decision, the federal courts have marked the existence of
an "expressly authorized" test and an apparently more liberal Supreme
Court approach towards construction of the Anti-Injunction Act.
THOMAS R. McGUIGAN
state courts towards the constitutional rights of its citizens now exists. If such is now the
case, it may be argued that the principle of avoiding "needless friction," as codified in the
Anti-Injunction Act, should take precedence over an exception not really "express," but
merely inferred from legislative intent.
38. "In so concluding, we do not question or qualify in any way the principles of
equity, comity and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a
state court proceeding." 92 S. Ct. at 2162. The Court expressly reaffirmed its earlier group
of decisions typified by Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
39. 92 S. Ct. at 2163. Justices White and Blackmun joined in Chief Justice Burger's
concurring opinion.
40. Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), with its requirement of a threat of
irreparable injury both "great and immediate," or bad faith and harrassment in a statute's
enforcement, may well limit Mitchun's practical effect. There is, however, no point in at-
tempting to analyze herein the possible post-Mitchum consequences of Younger on section
1983 actions.
41. Thus, "whether an Act of Congress . . . could be given its intended scope only
by the stay of a state court proceeding." 92 S. Ct. at 2160 (emphasis added).
